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Efforts to reduce carbon emissions significantly will require considerable improvements in
energy intensity, the ratio of energy consumption to economic activity. Improvements in energy
intensity over the past thirty years suggest great possibilities for energy conservation: current annual
energy consumption avoided due to declines in energy intensity since 1970 substantially exceed
current annual domestic energy supply.
While historic improvements in energy intensity suggest great scope for energy conservation
in the future, I argue that optimistic estimates of avoided energy costs due to energy conservation
are likely biased downward. I then analyze a data set on energy intensity in the United States at the
state level between 1970 and 2001 to disentangle the key elements of energy efficiency and
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I.  Introduction 
 
  Efforts to significantly reduce carbon emissions as part of any national strategy to 
address climate change will require considerable improvements in energy efficiency.  A 
recent study by the National Commission on Energy Policy and the Pew Center on 
Global Climate Change (2004) emphasized the need for improvements in energy 
efficiency as an important short-term strategy for reducing carbon emissions while 
waiting for more capital-intensive responses to come on-line in the longer-term.  Pacala 
and Socolow (2004) present "stabilization wedges," activities that reduce carbon 
emissions so as to achieve stabilization of atmospheric carbon concentrations at 500 ppm.  
Each wedge has the potential to reduce 1 GtC/year after fifty years and seven wedges are 
required for stabilization, according to the authors.  They present fifteen wedge options, 
four of which involve energy efficiency improvements and conservation.  In fact, the 
authors argue that "[i]mprovements in efficiency and conservation probably offer the 
greatest potential to provide wedges." (p. 969)  Energy efficiency improvements also 
factor into the Bush Administration's replacement of carbon emission targets with carbon 
intensity targets (carbon emissions relative to GDP).  In 2002, the administration called 
for a reduction in carbon intensity of 18 percent over the decade.  In a similar vein, the 
National Commission on Energy Policy (2004) recommended greenhouse gas emission 
reductions through the use of carbon emission intensity caps.  In their proposal, the 
Commission recommends a gradual reduction in carbon intensity of 2.4 percent per year 
beginning in 2010.  One of the key recommendations to contribute to this goal is 
enhanced energy efficiency.  The NCEP recommendations form the basis for the plan   2 
proposed by Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) to reduce carbon emissions.
1  Pizer (2005) 
makes an economic and political economy case for intensity targets for carbon emissions. 
  Reductions in carbon intensity can be achieved in two ways: fuel switching and 
reductions in energy intensity.  Energy intensity is the amount of energy consumed per 
dollar of GDP (more broadly, per unit of economic activity).  I focus in this analysis on 
the economic forces affecting changes in energy intensity.  To appreciate the importance 
of improvements in energy intensity as a contributor towards reducing reliance on fossil 
fuels, consider the following thought experiment.  Imagine that the United States had the 
same energy intensity in 2003 that it had in 1970.   At that energy intensity, the United 
States would have consumed 186.8 quadrillion BTUs of energy (or quads) in 2003.  In 
actuality, the United States consumed 98.2 quads of energy in that year.  This thought 
experiment suggests that we "conserved" 88.6 quads of energy in 2003 through 
reductions in energy intensity.  Table 1 compares this energy savings with domestic 
energy production in that year. 
 
Table 1.  Domestic Energy Supply in 2003 




Fossil Fuels  56.4  35.4 
Nuclear  8.0  5.0 
Renewables  6.2  3.9 
Energy Conservation  88.6  55.7 
Total  159.2  100.0 
 
Treating energy conservation as a supply source, Table 1 points out that it is the United 
States's single largest source of energy in 2003.  Of course, one cannot attribute all of the 
reductions in energy intensity to conservation and efficiency activities.  Some of the 
                                                 
1  While framed in terms of carbon intensity limits, the Bingaman proposal, as submitted as an amendment 
to the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (S.A. 868), in fact places a cap on carbon emissions but provides for a 
safety valve at $7 per ton of CO2.   3 
reductions in energy intensity have come about due to shifts in economic activity (shifts 
from manufacturing, for example, to services) that have nothing to do with energy 
considerations.  But the experiment is suggestive of the importance of energy 
conservation as a strategy for reducing energy consumption in general and carbon 
emissions in particular. 
  The goal of this paper is to analyze in greater detail the sources of and potential 
for improvements in energy intensity in the United States.  Using state-level data on 
energy consumption between 1970 and 2003, I investigate the role that income and prices 
play in influencing energy consumption.  In addition, following Boyd and Roop (2004) I 
use a Fisher ideal index number methodology to decompose changes in energy intensity 
into efficiency and activity components.  Efficiency refers to the reduced energy use per 
unit of economic activity within a particular sector (e.g. industrial sector) while activity 
refers to the changing mix of economic activity (shift from energy intensive economic 
activity towards non-energy intensive economic activity). 
  This paper builds on Boyd and Roop's work in several ways.  First, my analysis 
focuses on total energy consumption rather than consumption in the manufacturing sector 
alone.  Moreover, I construct and analyze indexes at the state level over a much longer 
time period.  And unlike previous work in this area, I use regression analysis to measure 
the impact of changes in economic and climate variables on the components of changes 
in energy intensity.
2   
                                                 
2 Sue Wing and Eckaus (2004) decompose energy intensity at the national level for 35 industries and 
analyze the drivers of efficiency and economic activity using results from estimating a quasi-fixed input 
cost model.  While based on a structural underlying production model, their decomposition is not exact and, 
more important, some of the impact of changes in efficiency show up in their structural term making it 
difficult to determine through which avenues energy prices affect energy intensity.   4 
  I find that improvements in energy efficiency are responsible for between 2/3 and 
3/4 of the decline in energy intensity since 1970.  In addition, rising per capita income 
contributes to declines in energy intensity, primarily through improvements in energy 
efficiency.  Finally, the price elasticity of energy intensity is between -0.1 and -0.6, again 
with price affecting energy intensity primarily through efficiency gains.    
II.  The Potential for Energy Efficiency 
 
  While policy interest in energy conservation is quite high, there are a number of 
unanswered questions which bear on policy development in this area.  First, what is the 
potential for energy conservation to contribute to climate change mitigation?  And 
second, how costly will enhanced energy conservation be?  As noted above in the thought 
experiment I described, energy conservation appears to have enormous potential to 
reduce our reliance on carbon-based fuels.  Unfortunately researchers have widely 
diverging perspectives on the cost-effectiveness of conservation enhancing measures.  On 
the one hand, some analysts are enormously optimistic as the following quotation 
suggests: “The overall economic benefits of these policies [to stimulate energy 
conservation] appear to be comparable to their overall costs.  The [Clean Energy Future] 
policies could produce direct benefits, including energy savings, that exceed their direct 
costs (e.g. technology and policy investments).”  (Interlaboratory Working Group (2000), 
p. ES 1).  On the other hand, a German economist in his assessment of utility 
conservation programs notes that “… conservation will not be a free lunch and will 
definitely not come cheap.”  Wirl (2000), p. 106. 
  How do we reconcile these differing points of view.  At the risk of gross 
simplification, energy technologists tend to fall into the first group while economists into   5 
the second group.  These groups differ on three key dimensions.  First, energy 
technologists generally focus on policies that minimize energy use while economists on 
policies that maximize economic welfare.  The development of appliance energy 
standards illustrates the distinction.  Appliance standards for energy consumption were 
developed in the 1980s by reviewing the range of possible technologies and comparing 
the incremental purchase costs of more efficient appliances to their lower operating costs.  
Standards were set to minimize the lifetime cost of the appliance.  The choice of a 
particular technology standard followed from the choice of a discount rate (to trade-off 
future savings against current costs) as well as assumptions on use patterns that influence 
the future savings.   
  Such a policy may be welfare enhancing but ignores important factors that will 
affect the welfare gains and losses.  Heterogeneity in use, for example, influences the 
cost-benefit calculation.  Consider the standards for air conditioners.  Someone living in a 
hot and humid climate will be an intensive user and so likely benefit from an aggressive 
efficiency standard that trades off considerable up-front incremental cost against large 
reductions in future energy bills.  Another person, however, may be only an occasional 
user of her air conditioner and so may find that the much higher purchase price of an 
energy efficient air conditioner does not pay off in future energy savings.  There may also 
be heterogeneity in discount rates.  High discount rate households will not benefit as 
much from future energy savings and so can be adversely affected by an overly 
aggressive energy efficiency standard.  In effect, the efficiency standard is a Procrustean 
policy that forces all to fit a single standard with concomitant economic efficiency losses.  
Appliance standards may reduce energy use but may not maximize consumer well-being   6 
conditional on a given reduction in energy use.  In addition, it is also likely to be a 
regressive policy given the well-documented higher discount rates for low-income 
households.
3 
  The choice of discount rate is further complicated by issues of risk.  Investments 
in energy efficient capital are inherently risky.  The payoff to the investment depends on 
future energy prices which can rise (as we are now observing) or fall (as they did in the 
1990s).  Moreover, the investments have an irreversible element; that is, they cannot be 
unwound without cost.  This combination can drive the required discount rate (or hurdle 
rate) for investment up thereby delaying investment (viz. Hassett and Metcalf (1996)).  
Empirical evidence bears this out.  A recent study of Dutch Greenhouse energy-saving 
investments finds a hurdle rate 75 percent higher than calculated in studies with no 
uncertainty (Diederen et al. (2003)). 
  Second, while both groups focus on correcting market failures, the first group also 
puts great emphasis on the role of market barriers.  To quote a leading energy researcher, 
“’Market barriers’ refer to obstacles that are not based on market failures but which 
nonetheless contribute to the slow diffusion and adoption of energy-efficient innovations”  
Brown (2001).   These include incomplete information, low priority of energy issues, 
capital market barriers, and incomplete markets for energy efficient products.  An 
economist would characterize many of these issues as unmeasured costs.  Information 
acquisition is costly.  A market barrier example that is often used is the periodic 
electricity bill that consumers receive.  Continuous time awareness of electricity use and 
cost, it is suggested, will spur conservation.  But experimental evidence suggests that 
instantaneous monitoring has, at best, modest conservation impacts (see Matsukawa 
                                                 
3 Sutherland (1994) makes a similar argument for utility conservation programs.   7 
(2004)).  Thus it is not clear how much we can achieve with information programs.  That 
consumers place a low priority on energy issues also speaks to the costs of information 
acquisition.  To quote from the Clean Energy Future study, “energy efficiency is not a 
major concern for most consumers because energy costs are not high relative to the cost 
of many other goods and services.” (Interlaboratory Working Group (2000), p. 2.13).  
This is not to say that we should ignore market barriers.  But we should be careful to 
assess the appropriate role for government.  Information is a public good and so likely to 
be underprovided in the private market.  On this ground alone, there is likely to be an 
important role for government to play in providing information.
4 
  Third, while economists take into account behavioral responses to policy 
programs, energy technologists tend to ignore behavioral responses.  As the lead authors 
of the Clean Energy Future study acknowledge, "as an engineering economic study, the 
CEF analysis is unable to incorporate the full impact of market-wide behavioral 
responses to policies”  Brown et al. (2001).  The three major behavioral issues are free 
riding, rebound, and moral hazard.  Free riding refers to fact that when a conservation 
incentive program is offered, it is taken up not only by agents who would not have 
engaged in the conservation activity in the absence of the program, but also by agents 
who would have taken up the activity regardless of the program.  The result is that any 
assessment of the program will overestimate the energy savings resulting from the 
program or – equivalently – underestimate the cost per unit of energy saved from the 
program.  A recent RAND study finds significantly higher costs of avoided electricity in 
                                                 
4  New research in behavioral economics also suggests that there may be highly effective, low-cost 
interventions to enhance energy efficiency.  In another context that may be instructive for energy 
conservation, Beshears et al. (2006) demonstrates a number of low-cost interventions that can raise private 
saving in pension plans.   8 
Demand Side Management (DSM) programs than utility estimates, a difference they 
attribute to free-riding (Loughran and Kulick (2004)).  The study estimates the cost of 
avoided electricity from DSM at $.14 to $.22 or $.06 to $.12 (depending on the study 
group) as compared to utility estimates of $.02 to $.03 per kWh.  Similarly a recent Dutch 
study estimates that nearly 50 percent of subsidy recipients from an energy efficiency 
subsidy program directed at businesses are free-riders (Blok et al. (2004)). 
  The rebound effect is simply a restatement of the law of demand: when prices fall, 
demand rises.  Higher fuel efficiency standards for automobiles, for example, lower the 
cost of driving.  This, in turn, increases the demand for driving.  A recent survey suggests 
rebound for residential (and transportation) sectors as high as 50 percent (Greening et al. 
(2000)).
5  
  Finally, the presence of moral hazard influences policy design.  Investors may 
delay investments to take advantage of prospective investment subsidies.  If we cannot 
distinguish marginal investors from free-riding delay investors, an optimal subsidy 
scheme may be to focus a subsidy on the latter group to encourage speedier investment 
(Wirl (1999)).  An additional implication of Wirl's result is that it may be preferable to 
direct energy efficiency subsidies to energy intensive consumers (e.g. purchasers of hot 
tubs and heated swimming pools), a policy outcome that many would find 
counterintuitive. 
  This review is not meant to throw cold water on energy efficiency as an element 
of a climate change program.  Indeed, as the Pew study cited earlier suggests, it will be an 
essential element in any comprehensive climate change program  But this review should 
                                                 
5 Small and Van Dender (2005) find a rebound effect of about 10 percent.  Parry (2006) finds that the 
failure of CAFE to raise driving costs contributes to it being dominated by other policies to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions from passenger vehicles.   9 
suggest caution in the face of claims that energy efficiency will come at low or even 
negative cost.  I next turn to a review of energy consumption trends in the United States 
followed by an analysis of energy intensity improvements in the United States at the state 
level to see what we can learn from the experience of the past thirty years.  
III.  Background on Energy Consumption Trends 
 
  Figure 1 shows energy consumption in the United States from 1900 through 
2004.
6  Energy consumption has risen sharply over the century at an annual growth rate 
of 2.51 percent per year.  Growth rates were higher prior to 1970 (3.66 percent between 
1900 and 1930 and 3.35 percent between 1931 and 1970) than after 1970 (1.08 percent).   
  Energy consumption per capita also grew dramatically over the century (Figure 
2).  Per capita energy consumption rose from 100 million BTUs to nearly 350 in 2004.  
The growth rate between 1900 and 2004 was 1.19 percent.  Again, the growth rate in the 
pre-1970 era was much higher (2.0 percent) than in the post-1970 era (.04 percent).   
  Figure 3 shows energy growth per dollar of GDP.
7  Energy intensity peaked in 
1917 at 35 thousand BTUs per dollar of GDP ($2000) and has gradually declined to its 
current level of 9.3.
8  I will focus most on this relationship given the current interest in 
reducing carbon intensity in United States policy.  The initial growth of energy intensity 
can be explained, according to Schurr and Netschert (1960) on the electrification of the 
country that began in earnest at the turn of the century and contributed to rapid growth in 
manufacturing.  By 1920, however, the improved thermal efficiency associated with 
electricity combined with a shift from coal to petroleum as well as increasing 
                                                 
6 Data prior to 1949 are taken from Schurr and Netschert (1960) and exclude fuel wood consumption.  Data 
for 1949 and later are taken from Energy Information Administration (2004).  Energy consumption is in 
quads (quadrillion BTUs). 
7  GNP is used for the pre-1929 data. 
8 If animal power were included, the peak might occur sooner.   10 
productivity led to a turning point and the beginning of a long and gradual decline in 
energy intensity.    
  An important point emerging from Figure 3 is that improvements in energy 
intensity are not entirely a post-oil shock phenomenon.  While energy intensity fell at a 
rate of 1.9 percent after 1970, it was falling at a rate of 0.9 percent between 1931 and 
1970.  The acceleration in the rate of decline following the 1970s oil shocks suggests the 
sensitivity of energy intensity to economic forces.  I next turn to an econometric analysis 
to further investigate the underlying forces driving this decline. 
IV.  Decomposing Energy Intensity Into  Structural and Efficiency Effects 
 
   Energy intensity (et) is a function of energy efficiency and economic activity.  
Specifically, 
 




























where Et is aggregate energy consumption in year t, Eit, energy consumption in sector i in 
year t, Yt is GDP in year t, and Yit is a measure of economic activity in sector i in year t.  
Note that energy consumption in the sectors must sum to aggregate energy consumption 
but the measures of economic activity need not sum to GDP (indeed, they need not be in 
the same units).   Equation 1 simply states that aggregate energy intensity is a function of 
sector specific energy efficiency (eit) and sectoral activity (sit).   
  Decomposing changes in energy intensity into components based on 
improvements in energy efficiency and changes in economic activity became a major   11 
research topic beginning in the mid-1970s.
9  Ang and Zhang (2000) note that early 
researchers calculated the importance of changes in economic activity by computing 
energy intensity in a given year holding sectoral energy intensities constant.  Differences 
between this hypothetical energy intensity and measured energy intensity were attributed 
to changing economic activity.  Boyd et al. (1987) were the first to use index number 
theory to provide a theoretically based decomposition.  They used a Divisia Index 
number methodology and like earlier methodologies (which were essentially based on a 
Laspeyres Index), these decompositions had residual terms which could account for a 
considerable degree of the variability in the underlying index of energy intensity 
change.
10   Research in this area has increased sharply with Ang and Zhang noting that 
their 2000 survey found 124 studies, up from 51 in their 1995 survey.   
  Index number theory has a long history in economics with Irving Fisher being a 
key contributor to the literature.  Fisher (1921) identified two properties that he argued an 
index number should satisfy.  First, "[t]he formula should work both ways as to the two 
factors, prices and quantities." And second, it "should work both ways as to time." (p. 
534, italics in original)  The first property (known as factor reversal) is equivalent to 
perfect decomposition (i.e. no residual).  The second property means that an index 
computed between, say 1970 and 2000 should be the inverse of the same index computed 
between 2000 and 1970.  Fisher proposed what has become known as the Fisher Ideal 
index which satisfies both these properties.  This index is the geometric mean of the 
Laspeyres and Paasche indexes.  Boyd and Roop (2004) use this index as the basis for an 
exact decomposition of changes in energy intensity into changes in energy efficiency and 
                                                 
9   Ang and Zhang (2000) provide a survey of this literature.  My discussion of this literature draws on their 
survey. 
10 Greening et al. (1997) compare six different decomposition methodologies on the basis of their residuals.   12 
economic activity.  I will be using this approach at both the national level and at the state-
level. 
  Denoting e0 as the aggregate energy intensity for a base year, we can construct an 
energy intensity index as et/e0.  Following Diewert (2001), it can be shown that we can 
effect this decomposition if 1) we can construct sectors that account for all energy use in 
the economy without overlap (i.e. a partition); and 2) there exists a set of economic 
activity measures (Yit) that provide a sensible measure of energy intensity.  Note that 
these economic activity measures do not need to form a partition.   
  To construct the Fisher Ideal index, I first construct Laspeyres and Paasche 





























































The Laspeyres indexes use a base period fixed weight while the Paasche indexes use an 














t P L F = . 
   13 
As noted above, Fisher (1921) showed that his ideal index satisfied perfect 
decomposition of an expenditure index into a price and quantity index.  In our context, a 
Fisher ideal index provides a perfect decomposition of an aggregate energy intensity 













This is a very attractive property for an energy intensity index since other intensity 
indexes have residual terms that make difficult an interpretation of the relative 
importance of compositional effects and efficiency effects.   
  This decomposition suggests a way to attribute changes in energy consumption 
arising from improvements in energy intensity.  Recall that my thought experiment in the 
Introduction suggested energy savings of 88.6 quads of energy in 2003 given the 
improvements in energy intensity between 1970 and 2003.  Using my notation from this 
section, the change in energy ( t E D ) is  
(6)   




t t t t
t t t t
t t t
F e Y F e Y I e Y
I e Y e e Y
E E E
ln ln ) ln(









where  t E ˆ  is the level of energy consumption that would have occurred had energy 
intensity remained at 1970 levels and the first equality in the last line of (6) is a first order 
Taylor Series approximation.  Equation (6) gives us a way to decompose the change in 
energy use perfectly into an efficiency and activity component.  I will carry out this 
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IV A.  Analysis at the National Level 
  I first provide an example of the Fisher decomposition at the national level using 
data from 1970 through 2003.  I partition aggregate energy use into residential, 
commercial, industrial, and transportation sectors and use economic activity measures 
appropriate for each energy sector as discussed in the next two sub-sections.
11  Table 2 
shows my sectors and summary statistics for the measures of economic activity in that 
sector that I use for the decomposition as well as summary statistics on sectoral energy 
efficiency.   
Table 2.  Sectors for Decomposition Analysis at National Level 
  Economic Activity  Sectoral Energy Efficiency 
Sector  Measure  Mean  Standard 





($2000 in billions) 




4,090  861 
Commercial 
Value Added in 
Commercial Sector ($2000 
in billions) 




2,847  440 
Industrial  Value Added in Industrial 




17,156  2328 
Transportation  Vehicle Miles Traveled 
(billions of miles)  1,953  550  BTUs per 
VMT  11,512  1,787 




13,333  2,717 
Data from 1970 to 2003.  The industrial sector includes manufacturing, agriculture, forestry, fishing, 
mining, and construction.  The commercial sector includes transportation, communication, wholesale 
and retail trade, finance, services, and government. 
 
                                                 
11   The Energy Information Administration attributes electricity consumption to these four sectors based on 
usage.  The degree of disaggregation affects the relative importance of efficiency and economic activity 
changes.  This disaggregation, for example, obscures shifts from energy intensive manufacturing to non-
energy intensive manufacturing.  Such shifts will show up here as efficiency improvements.  I discuss this 
further below.   15 
  Figure 4 shows the results of this decomposition analysis for the United States 
taking 1970 as the base year for the analysis.
12   Aggregate energy intensity in 2003 was 
53 percent of its intensity level in 1970.  The activity index was 86 percent of its level in 
1970 while the efficiency index was 61 percent of its 1970 level.  In other words, had the 
composition of economic activity not changed between 1970 and 2003, energy intensity 
would have been 61 percent of its 1970 level.  The forty percent improvement in energy 
intensity was due to improvements in energy efficiency.  Similarly, had energy efficiency 
been fixed at its 1970 levels for all sectors, changes in economic activity would have led 
to a 14 percent reduction in energy intensity.  This decomposition allows us to estimate 
the impact of changes in energy prices and income on energy intensity holding constant 
either changes in sectoral energy efficiency or economic activity. 
  Using equation (7), I can allocate the change in energy use (relative to the amount 
that would have been consumed had energy intensity remained at its 1970 level) between 
efficiency and economic activity.  Based on this approach, roughly one-quarter of the 
88.6 quads of energy reduction arising from improvements in energy intensity can be 
attributed to changes in the composition of economic activity and the remaining three-
quarters to improvements in energy efficiency.
13  Figure 5 shows the contributions of 
improvements in energy efficiency and compositional changes on energy savings 
between 1970 and 2003.  Initial reductions in energy consumption can be attributed 
                                                 
12   See Appendix Table A1 for the index numbers at the national level. 
13   This is conditional on the particular choice of sectors in this analysis.  To see whether finer 
disaggregation within the industrial sector affects the results, I constructed Fisher efficiency and activity 
indexes for the manufacturing sector disaggregating at the two-digit SIC level between 1974 and 1997 (data 
available from Energy Information Administration at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/mecs/).  Energy 
intensity ( energy consumption per dollar of real value added in manufacturing) fell by the same percentage 
in manufacturing as it did in the economy as a whole between 1974 and 1997.  Based on my Fisher indexes 
for this disaggregation, improvements in efficiency were responsible for 82 percent of the improvement in 
energy intensity and changes in economic activity for 18 percent as of 1997.  Thus it does not appear that I 
am imparting significant bias by failing to disaggregate the industrial sector further.   16 
almost entirely to improvements in efficiency.
14  By 1990 changes in economic activity 
were beginning to contribute substantially to energy savings with major increases in the 
activity component around 1997. 
IV B.  Analysis at the State Level 
  To further investigate the forces contributing to changes in energy intensity, I next 
turn to an analysis at the state-level.
15  Table 3 shows my sectors and measures of 
economic activity that I use to construct the indexes. 
Table 3.  Sectors for Decomposition Analysis at State Level 
  Economic Activity  Sectoral Energy Efficiency 
Sector  Measure  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Measure  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Residential  personal income ($2000 




3,018  832 
Commercial 
earnings by place of work 
in commercial sector 
($2000 in billions) 




4,227  961 
Industrial 
earnings by place of work 
in industrial sector 
($2000 in billions) 




23,014  18,355 
Transportation  Vehicle Miles Traveled 
(billions of miles)  34.2  38.0  BTUs per 
VMT  11,576  2,906 
Total  personal income ($2000 




14,721  6,812 
Data from 1960 to 2001 for the 48 continental states.  The industrial sector includes manufacturing, 
agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, and construction.  The commercial sector includes transportation, 
communication, wholesale and retail trade, finance, services, and government.  Sectoral energy efficiency 
summary statistics weighted by personal income. 
 
 
I maintain the same sectors (residential, commercial, industrial, and transportation) but 
adapt the methodology for a state-level analysis in two ways.  First, my measure of 
                                                 
14  In fact, in some early years, changes in economic activity led to increases in energy consumption. 
15   An additional reason for a state-level analysis is provided by Auffhammer and Steinhauser (2005).  
They find that carbon emission predictions are more accurate when built up from state-level predictions 
than when constructed at the national level.   17 
energy intensity is the ratio of total energy consumption to personal income.  I would 
prefer to use gross state product (GSP) but GSP only go back to 1977 and the series has a 
structural break in 1997 resulting from the shift from SIC to NAICS in that year.  BEA 
specifically advises against piecing together the pre and post-1997 data into a single time-
series.
16  Second, I use earnings by place of work in the commercial (industrial) sector as 
my measure of economic activity in the commercial (industrial) sector.   
  Table 4 provides summary statistics on the energy intensity measure for the 48 
continental states for various years between 1960 and 2001. 
 
Table 4. State-Level Energy Intensity 





1960  1.000  0.0  1.000  1.000  -  - 
1970  0.977  0.098  0.774  1.390  -0.23%  -0.23% 
1980  0.835  0.091  0.584  1.002  -0.90%  -2.02% 
1990  0.713  0.129  0.474  1.178  -1.12%  -1.57% 
2001  0.615  0.127  0.433  1.098  -1.18%  -1.34% 
Author's calculations. 
 
Several facts emerge from this table.  First, (unweighted) average energy intensity has 
been declining at a 1.2 percent annual rate between 1960 and 2001.  Not surprisingly, the 
decrease was more rapid in the '70s and '80s given the oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979.  
Second, the variation in intensity across states is rising.  The coefficient of variation, for 
example, doubles between 1970 and 2001.  Third, while some states have reduced their 
energy intensity dramatically (Rhode Island's intensity fell by nearly 57 percent between 
1960 and 2001), other states have failed to reduce their energy intensity at all (North 
                                                 
16   One result of this change in definition is that a measure of national energy intensity built up from state-
level data differs somewhat from the intensity measures reported earlier in the paper.  Aggregating up from 
the state-level, energy intensity in 2001 is 62 percent of its 1970 value, as compared to 53 percent using 
national data.  Trends, however, are unaffected by the change and the correlation between the two time 
series between 1970 and 2001 is 0.99.     18 
Dakota's intensity increased by nearly 10 percent over this period).  Figure 6 shows the 
changes in energy intensity for the eight states with the largest and smallest declines in 
energy intensity across this period.  Not only are the trends different, but the patterns of 
change are different.  Explaining this variation across states is a major focus of the 
econometric analysis below. 
  Table 5 provides summary information on the energy efficiency index.   
 
Table 5. State-Level Energy Efficiency Index 





1960  1.000  0.0  1.000  1.000  -  - 
1970  1.019  0.108  0.826  1.535  0.19%  0.19% 
1980  0.909  0.117  0.621  1.253  -0.48%  -1.14% 
1990  0.819  0.164  0.535  1.417  -0.66%  -1.04% 
2001  0.736  0.163  0.506  1.442  -0.74%  -0.97% 
Author's calculations. 
 
Energy efficiency worsened between 1960 and 1970.  Holding economic activity 
constant, changes in efficiency led to a 0.2 percent per year on average increase in energy 
consumption relative to economic activity in the states.  This trend was reversed in the 
1970s which saw a 1.1 percent per year improvement in efficiency.  Efficiency continued 
to improve though at a declining rate in the 1980s and 1990s.  As with overall energy 
intensity, the variation in efficiency improvements increasingly varied across states over 
time with the coefficient of variation more than doubling between 1970 and 2001.  
Finally, a number of states experienced declines in energy efficiency (holding economic 
activity constant).  North Dakota's index rose by 44 percent between 1960 and 2001, an 
annual increase of .9 percent.  Figure 7 shows the changes in the efficiency index for the 
states with the largest and smallest declines in their index.   
  Table 6 provides information on the economic activity index.   19 
 
Table 6. State-Level Energy Activity Index 





1960  1.000  0.0  1.000  1.000  -  - 
1970  0.960  0.034  0.861  1.023  -0.41%  -0.41% 
1980  0.922  0.052  0.712  1.008  -0.41%  -0.40% 
1990  0.874  0.055  0.750  0.992  -0.45%  -0.53% 
2001  0.840  0.060  0.692  1.092  -0.42%  -0.36% 
Author's calculations. 
 
There is much less variation over time in the reduction in energy intensity due to changes 
in economic activity relative to the variation in energy intensity or in the energy 
efficiency index.  There is also less variation across the states at any point in time.  While 
the coefficient of variation doubles between 1970 and 2001, it is roughly one-third the 
coefficient of variation in any given year for the energy efficiency index.  Figure 8 shows 
the change over time in the structural index for the four states with the largest and 
smallest changes in the index respectively.   
  As I did with the national data, we can measure the relative contributions of 
improved energy efficiency and structural change to improved energy intensity and 
consider the variation across the states.  Table 7 reports summary statistics on the shares 
for the states in 2001. 
Table 7.  Efficiency and Activity Contributions to 
Changes in Intensity 
Share Due to:  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Efficiency  64%  17%  28%  106% 
Activity  36%  17%  -6%  72% 
Author's calculations for 2001.  ND and WY excluded 
   20 
Efficiency contributes to the roughly two-thirds of the decline in intensity between 1960 
and 2001.  I excluded North Dakota and Wyoming from the table as they are significant 
outliers.
17     
  Before turning to a regression analysis of variation in state-level energy intensity, 
I briefly discuss the only other study of which I am aware that addresses state-level 
changes in energy intensity.  Bernstein et al. (2003) run fixed effects regressions at the 
state-level between 1977 and 1999 of energy intensity (in log form) on  various variables 
(gross state product, energy prices, climate data, etc.) and compute a measure of "residual 
energy intensity," the difference between observed log energy intensity and predicted 
intensity (including observed variables and year effects but not fixed effects).  Residual 
energy intensity  in their view "may contain useful information about the role of policy in 
lowering energy intensity."  (p. 21)  My dataset improves on the Bernstein et al. dataset in 
several ways.  First, it is a more comprehensive dataset running from 1960 to 2001 (1970 
to 2001 for regressions below using energy prices).  Second, their study uses gross state 
product as a measure of economic activity despite a structural break in GSP occurring in 
1997.  Third, their residential and transportation energy intensity measures are energy use 
per capita rather than consumption relative to a measure of economic activity.  Fourth, I 
use the Fisher ideal index decomposition to separate out efficiency and composition 
effects explicitly.  The advantage of the approach I propose is that compositional change 
may be driven in part by energy price changes.  I can test for this indirect effect of energy 
                                                 
17 Wyoming's efficiency contribution is -258 percent.  This state had a 5 percent decline in energy intensity 
but its efficiency index actually rose by 14 percent while its structural index fell by 17 percent.  As a 
consequence its share due to structural change rose by 358 percent.  There is one other major outlier.  North 
Dakota's intensity index rose by 10 percent with its efficiency index rising by 44 percent and its structural 
index falling by 24 percent.  Including these two states does not change the average share contributions 
appreciably.  It does drive up the standard deviation sharply.   21 
prices on improved energy intensity by regressing the composition index on prices (along 
with other variables) to measure the impact.  Fifth, their study's weather data are at the 
census region rather than state level (as in my dataset).
18 
V.  Empirical Work 
 
  I next present results from various regressions of the different indexes on 
economic and weather related variables.  Under the assumption that states are price takers 
in energy markets, I interpret these as energy demand-style regressions.
19   I've included 
an energy price variable, per capita income, and climate data (heating and cooling degree 
days).    Summary statistics for the regression data are in Table 8. 
Table 8.  Summary Statistics 
Variable  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Min  Max 
Intensity  0.772  0.149  0.433  1.390 
Efficiency  0.860  0.155  0.505  1.757 
Activity  0.898  0.065  0.628  1.131 
Real energy price ($1982-
84/million BTUs)  6.366  1.579  2.454  12.532 
Real income per capita 
($1982-84)  13087  2669  6758  24235 
Heating degree days 
(1000)  5.37  2.09  0.48  11.12 
Cooling degree days 
(1000)  1.06  0.77  0.07  3.85 
ln(income per capita)  9.459  0.200  8.818  10.096 
ln(income per capita)
2  89.5  3.8  77.8  101.9 
ln(HDD)  1.576  0.510  -0.742  2.409 
ln(CDD) 
-
0.210  0.759  -2.617  1.347 
ln(energy price)  1.821  0.247  0.898  2.528 
Summary statistics on 48 continental states between 1970 and 2001 (1,536 
observations). 
                                                 
18 I am indebted to Maximilian Auffhammer for providing me with his state-level data on heating and 
cooling degree days.  Auffhammer obtained these data directly from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration.  See Auffhammer and Steinhauser (2005) for more information on these data. 
19 I constructed a Hausman test for energy price exogeneity by running a two-stage least squares regression 
using a synthetic energy price as instrument for the energy price.  The instrument is the average of state 
energy prices of those states adjacent to a given state in each year.  Regression results are not appreciably 
changed by the use of this instrument and I fail to reject price exogeneity at the 95 percent level.   22 
 
  Table 9 presents results for the energy intensity index.  The first column presents 
results from a regression of intensity on the log of price, per capita income, log-per capita 
income squared, and climate variables.
20   
 
Table 9.  Semi-Log Intensity Regressions 


























































































Fixed Effects  no  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year Effects  no  no  yes  no  yes 
Adj. R
2  0.42  0.82  0.90  0.80  0.87 
 
The first three regressions include the current energy price only and differ in their 
inclusion of fixed state and/or year effects.  In the first regression there are neither state 
or year effects.  Energy intensity falls with higher energy prices with a semi-elasticity of  
                                                 
20  The energy price is the average weighted price of energy in the state based on fuel uses as computed by 
EIA.   23 
-.144.  A ten percent rise in energy prices is associated with a 1.4 percent drop in energy 
intensity.   In this (and subsequent) regressions, energy intensity is falling with respect to 
income given the range of income in the data set.    Energy intensity is higher in colder 
climates (more heating degree days (HDD)) with a statistically significant coefficient in 
the first three regressions.  Finally, energy intensity is lower in warmer climates.   
  Including fixed state effects increases the size of the price coefficient a bit.  
Adding year effects substantially increases the price coefficient from   -.179 to -.588.  It 
may be that the exclusion of year effects forces the price variables to pick up the effect of 
nation-wide macro shocks that are correlated with price changes.  The year effects are 
jointly significant and their inclusion does not impart any bias to the price variables.   
  Energy prices likely affect energy intensity with some amount of lag.  The next 
set of regressions in Table 10 provide results for current price plus five years of lags.   
More recent price changes (either current or a first lag) have stronger impacts on intensity 
than do more distant lags.  When price coefficients are positive, the effect is modest.  It 
may be more instructive to consider the impact of a permanent price change.  In both 
regressions reported, the response to a permanent price change is comparable in 
magnitude to the regression in current price only and precisely estimated.
21
                                                 
21 In all the sets of regressions, the coefficient on the permanent price change in regression with lagged 
prices is larger than the estimate for regressions with current price only.  This suggests the Le Chatelier 
Principle at work.   24 
 
Table 10.  Semi-Log Efficiency Regressions 


























































































Fixed Effects  no  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year Effects  no  no  yes  no  yes 
Adj. R
2  0.33  0.60  0.74  0.55  0.69 
 
  I report results from regressions with the efficiency index as the dependent 
variable in Table 10.  Regression results are similar to those from the intensity index 
regressions.  A very different pattern emerges from regressions with the activity index as 
the dependent variable (Table 11).  The coefficient on price is considerably smaller in 
magnitude and often positive in sign.  Climate variables and income also have a much 
smaller impact on the mix of economic activity and the fit of the regression is much 
poorer.   25 
Table 11.  Semi-Log Activity Regressions 


























































































Fixed Effects  no  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year Effects  no  no  yes  no  yes 
Adj. R
2  0.17  0.48  0.69  0.45  0.65 
 
Even with a five year set of price lags, it appears that prices affect energy intensity 
primarily through changes in efficiency. 
  Summing up, it appears that rising income contributes to declines in energy 
intensity.  Second, the long-run elasticity of energy intensity with respect to price is 
between -.25 and -.63 and that changes in energy price affect energy intensity through 
changes in efficiency more than changes in the mix of economic activity.
22 
                                                 
22 It is straightforward to show that the elasticity of demand for energy with respect to price equals the price 
coefficient from the intensity regression divided by the intensity index.  With an average state index level 
of .59 in 2001, the high-end estimate implies a price elasticity of demand of roughly -1.0.  Bjorner and 
Jensen (2002)  cite estimates from a survey by Atkinson and Manning (1995) of median elasticity estimates   26 
  Table 12 provides information for the top-10 energy consuming states in 2001.  
These ten states accounted for over half the energy consumption in that year.  The first 
section of the table provides information on improvements in energy intensity since 1960.  
Texas had the greatest decline in energy intensity with its 2001 value less than half its 
1960 value.  It ranked seventh among the 48 continental states for improvements in 
energy intensity over that period.  Relative to a weighted average improvement of  forty 
percent between 1960 and 2001 for the continental states, the top-ten states varied 
between 30 and 50 percent in their energy improvement.    
  The fixed effect reported indicates unmeasured and unvarying influences within 
the state that affect the intensity index.  Texas, for example, has a state fixed effect of      
-0.153.  After controlling for prices, income, and climate variation (as well as year 
specific effects), the average predicted intensity value for the state would be -0.153 lower 
than actually observed.  Using this as a measure of intrinsic state features influencing 
energy intensity, Texas ranks fifth on this index.  In other words, unobserved features of 
the state  lower the energy intensity ranking for Texas from seventh to fifth.  Several 
states have large and positive fixed effects (CA, FL, NY) that increase their energy 
intensity substantially.  Two of the states (TX and PA) have large and negative state fixed 
effects. 
  The pattern of rankings and fixed effects for the intensity index data and 
regressions are very similar to those of the energy intensity regressions, a not surprising 
result given the regression results suggesting the predominant role changes in energy 
efficiency play in affecting energy intensity.  
                                                                                                                                                 
of -0.5.  Time series estimates tend to be lower (median of -0.4) and cross-sectional estimates higher (-0.8).  
My high-end estimates are thus on the upper range of estimates.    27 
Table 12.  Top 10 Energy Consuming States in 2001 
    Intensity  Efficiency  Activity 
State  Consumption 
(Quads)  Value  Rank  FE  FE 
Rank  Value  Rank  FE  FE 
Rank  Value  Rank  FE  FE 
Rank 
TX  12.03  0.496  7  -0.153  5  0.620  11  -0.198  6  0.799  11  0.013  26 
CA  7.85  0.538  13  0.168  44  0.603  9  0.204  44  0.892  41  0.000  22 
FL  4.13  0.643  33  0.320  48  0.779  33  0.392  48  0.826  19  -0.029  13 
NY  4.13  0.578  22  0.197  45  0.645  15  0.278  45  0.896  43  -0.039  11 
OH  3.98  0.567  21  -0.068  15  0.702  21  -0.064  16  0.808  13  -0.016  16 
PA  3.92  0.503  8  -0.113  10  0.663  19  -0.060  17  0.759  4  -0.078  3 
IL  3.87  0.606  27  0.090  36  0.736  27  0.143  39  0.824  18  -0.039  10 
LA  3.50  0.694  39  -0.074  14  0.885  45  -0.161  10  0.784  6  0.054  42 
MI  3.12  0.642  32  0.015  27  0.708  23  -0.013  20  0.907  45  0.035  38 
GA  2.88  0.681  38  0.124  42  0.812  37  0.114  37  0.839  23  0.018  29 
FE: fixed effect from fixed effect and year regressions.  Rank is the rank order from lowest to highest.     28 
In the same vein, the magnitude and variability of the fixed effects from the activity index 
regressions are much smaller than for the efficiency index regressions. 
  How important are the price effects from these regressions?  To get a feel for this, 
we can do a back of the envelope calculation of the consequences of the recent run-up in 
energy prices for energy intensity.  The most recent Short Term Energy Outlook from the 
Energy Information Administration (2006) predicts that energy prices will rise by 
between 20 and 50 percent in real terms between 2001 and 2007.  Focusing on the 
regressions with fixed state effects but no year effects, the price coefficients suggest that 
a fifty percent increase in real energy prices would bring about a 7.3 percentage point 
















































Using the state average energy intensity of .59 for 2001 (weighted by energy 
consumption) and a growth rate in real personal income of 14 percent between 2001 and 
2007, energy use should be 1.6 percent higher in 2007 than it was in 2001.  This is 
roughly ten percent of the increase that would have occurred had the energy intensity 
ratio stayed the same between the two periods (14 percent).  Obviously, this is a crude 
calculation but suggests the magnitude of energy efficiency improvements in response to 
price changes. 
  A second policy experiment we can consider is whether the Bush Administration 
reduction in carbon intensity is feasible without substantial policy intervention.  In   29 
regressions not reported here, I added a time trend (and trend squared) to the regressions 
without year effects.  The trend coefficients suggest that absent changes in price, income, 
or weather conditions, energy intensity will trend downward over this decade by between 
3 and 4 percent.
23   
VI.  Conclusion 
  This paper is a first cut at understanding the forces driving improvements in 
energy intensity in the United States since 1970.  It builds on a large literature in energy 
decomposition analysis in several ways.  First, it is the only analysis of changes in energy 
intensity at the state level using a perfect decomposition methodology.  Second, this 
study uses econometric methods to identify the drivers of changes in efficiency and 
economic activity indexes.  I find that rising per capita income contributes to 
improvements in energy efficiency and intensity and that prices also play a key role.  
Neither price nor income has an appreciable impact on the mix of economic activities and 
– more importantly – changes in the mix of economic activity are considerably less 
important than improvements in efficiency over this time period to explain improvements 
in energy intensity.   
 
                                                 
23   Growth in income suggests we should observe a larger decline in energy (and thus carbon) intensity.  In 
fact carbon intensity fell by 16 percent between 1990 and 2000 suggesting that little policy intervention 
will be required to achieve the Bush Administration's goal of an 18 percent reduction in carbon intensity.   30 
 
Table A1.  U.S. Energy 
Intensity Indexes 
Year  Intensity  Activity  Efficiency 
1970  1.00  1.00  1.00 
1971  0.99  1.00  0.99 
1972  0.98  1.01  0.98 
1973  0.97  1.01  0.96 
1974  0.95  1.00  0.95 
1975  0.93  1.00  0.92 
1976  0.93  1.01  0.92 
1977  0.91  1.01  0.90 
1978  0.89  1.01  0.88 
1979  0.87  0.99  0.87 
1980  0.84  0.99  0.85 
1981  0.80  0.99  0.81 
1982  0.78  1.00  0.79 
1983  0.75  0.98  0.77 
1984  0.73  0.98  0.75 
1985  0.70  0.97  0.73 
1986  0.68  0.95  0.72 
1987  0.68  0.95  0.71 
1988  0.68  0.96  0.71 
1989  0.68  0.95  0.71 
1990  0.66  0.94  0.70 
1991  0.66  0.93  0.71 
1992  0.65  0.92  0.71 
1993  0.65  0.92  0.71 
1994  0.63  0.92  0.69 
1995  0.63  0.92  0.69 
1996  0.63  0.92  0.69 
1997  0.60  0.91  0.66 
1998  0.58  0.88  0.67 
1999  0.57  0.87  0.66 
2000  0.56  0.87  0.65 
2001  0.54  0.86  0.63 
2002  0.54  0.86  0.63 
2003  0.53  0.86  0.61 
See text for construction 
   31 
 
Table A2.  Efficiency and Activity 
Contributions to Changes in 
Intensity 
State  Efficiency  Activity 
WY  -258%  358% 
IA  28%  72% 
ME  31%  69% 
LA  33%  67% 
WV  40%  60% 
IN  43%  57% 
NJ  43%  57% 
SD  46%  54% 
SC  48%  52% 
NE  51%  49% 
OK  54%  46% 
GA  54%  46% 
MS  55%  45% 
MT  55%  45% 
WI  56%  44% 
AR  56%  44% 
FL  57%  43% 
PA  60%  40% 
KY  60%  40% 
AL  61%  39% 
IL  61%  39% 
OH  62%  38% 
WA  65%  35% 
ID  66%  34% 
VA  67%  33% 
NC  67%  33% 
KS  67%  33% 
NH  68%  32% 
TX  68%  32% 
MD  69%  31% 
NV  71%  29% 
TN  72%  28% 
MN  72%  28% 
NM  73%  27% 
DE  74%  26%   32 
CT  77%  23% 
MI  78%  22% 
OR  78%  22% 
RI  80%  20% 
NY  80%  20% 
UT  81%  19% 
CO  81%  19% 
CA  82%  18% 
MA  86%  14% 
AZ  89%  11% 
MO  94%  6% 
VT  106%  -6% 
ND  392%  -292% 
Author's calculations.  See text for details.   33 
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Figure 3.  Energy Consumption
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